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EVIDENCE AND ETHICS: LITIGATING IN THE
SHADOWS OF THE RULES
Joseph A. Colquitt*
What is morally wrong, cannot be professionally right, however it may be
sanctioned by time or custom. 1
INTRODUCTION
Many jurisdictions are blessed with modem, comprehensive rules of
evidence drawn from centuries of common law principles. Likewise, most
states also have contemporary rules of ethics compiled from a century of
such rules.2 Yet attorneys on both sides of a case often possess and
exercise considerable discretion during trials, and neither evidence law nor
ethics rules satisfactorily limit that discretion, which might permit an
attorney to violate the spirit of these rules.
It almost goes without saying that in the course of a trial, litigating
attorneys frequently make tactical decisions, such as whether to present
particular evidence or oppose an opponent's proffer of evidence. The rules
of evidence may permit the use of the particular evidence, yet the attorney
may choose to forego its use. The rules may bar the use of the evidence, yet
the opposing attorney might not object to the proffer. Thus, the rules
provide guidance, but not necessarily answers.
* Jere L. Beasley Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; Senior Circuit
Judge, State of Alabama. I thank the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for its
generous support. I appreciate the assistance of Robert Arnwine, Jr., Liz Whipple, Cherie
Knotts, and Trey Abbott, who provided research assistance and helpful comments. The
statements and opinions in this essay are mine alone, and naturally, I alone remain
responsible for any errors. It should be noted that to fit within the space available, this essay
relies primarily on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, and cases that illustrate the point under discussion. It also focuses on two
criminal case scenarios, and eschews discussing civil litigation, although much of the
discussion also is applicable to civil matters.
1. Resolution XXXIII, in 2 David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 765 (Baltimore,
Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836).
2. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385, 1448 (2004) ("By 2000, most states had adopted some
form of the Model Rules .. "). The American Bar Association (ABA) first promulgated
standards in 1908. Id. at 1385. Its Canon of Ethics was drafted from the 1887 Alabama State
Bar's Code of Ethics. Id.
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Similarly, rules of ethics do not always determine how an attorney should
conduct the prosecution or defense of a case. 3 The rules may strictly
govern an action, or they may only suggest how an attorney should pursue a
matter during litigation. Just as with evidence rules, strict adherence to the
rules of ethics still may leave an attorney with considerable discretion. This
essay examines two scenarios in which such remaining discretion exists to
highlight the point that rules of evidence and ethics may not adequately
inform attorneys of the proper course of action during litigation.
A considerable number of scholarly writings discuss the ethics of
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Many of these articles and books
address particularly challenging issues such as whether a prosecutor should
pursue a case if she believes the accused is innocent of the charges, 4 or
whether an attorney should attempt to discredit a witness who he knows (or,
perhaps, only believes) is telling the truth,5 or how a criminal defense
attorney should deal with the lying client.6 This essay's scenarios present a
different issue, namely whether an attorney-prosecutor or defense
counsel-should call a witness primarily to prejudice the opposing party,
with little regard for whether the testimony is really necessary to support his
case or unduly prejudices the witness and/or the opposing party. Each of
the scenarios presents an alternative method-the stipulation-that might
meet the needs of the litigant without injecting unnecessary prejudicial
information into the trial.
This essay introduces the scenarios to examine the customary conduct of
attorneys and judges during criminal litigation. The applicable rules are
identified, analyzed, and applied within the scenarios to discuss the role of
3. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyer's Ethics 296
(2d ed. 2002) (noting the inadequacy of rules of ethics and restatements "to establish rules of
ethical conduct that are adequate to the special role [of prosecutors] that they so clearly
recognize"); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1573, 1596
(noting that "[t]he existing provisions of Model Rule 3.8 address five aspects of
prosecutorial conduct, but.., they impose relatively little restraint on prosecutors and leave
much troublesome conduct unaddressed").
4. See, e.g., Freedman & Smith, supra note 3, at 300 ("[C]onscientious prosecutors do
not put the destructive engine of the criminal process into motion unless they are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty."); Green, supra note 3, at 1588
("[P]rosecutors are expected to bring prosecutions only when the guilt of the accused is
sufficiently certain."); cf Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2002) ("The prosecutor
in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is
not supported by probable cause ....").
5. See, e.g., Freedman & Smith, supra note 3, at 294; see also R. Michael Cassidy,
Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor's Ethical
Duty to "Seek Justice," 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 635, 636 (2006); Monroe H. Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions,
64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469, 1469 (1966); Green, supra note 3, at 1596 (stating that "a prosecutor
has a responsibility not to mislead the fact fmder by casting doubt on the credibility of
testimony the prosecutor knows to be truthful").
6. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin, The Perplexing Problem of Client Perjury, 76 Fordham
L. Rev. 1707, 1710 (2007) ("It is difficult to imagine a more important topic at the very
intersection of ethics and evidence than the ethical obligations of criminal defense lawyers
when confronted with false testimony from their own client.").
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lawyers in the litigation setting. This essay will show that attorneys are
often confronted with situations in which the rules of evidence and ethics
have been exhausted, and yet difficult evidentiary or ethical decisions
remain. It does not purport to provide a thorough analysis of the provisions
and use of particular rules because that undertaking would distract from the
essay's focus. The essay eschews any discussion of the attorney's role in
office practice. It is broader, though, than simply a discussion of tactical
decision making in the litigation setting because it implicates the
relationships of attorneys to the court and others, such as opposing parties,
jurors, and witnesses.
Part I of this essay deals with Scenario 1, addressing potentially
prejudicial motive evidence which generally is deemed relevant but
unnecessary in homicide prosecutions. Within the scenario, this essay
discusses the customary procedures, the roles of the parties and the judge
(focusing primarily on the prosecutor), and the pertinent rules of evidence
and ethics. Part II addresses Scenario 2, and employs the same approach
used in Scenario 1 in examining evidence of a previous false claim in a rape
case. Scenario 2, though, focuses principally on the defense attorney. Part
III notes the difficulty of identifying beforehand the countless situations
attorneys may face during litigation and the difficulty of drafting rules
sufficiently detailed to be useful to attorneys and judges during trials, yet
general enough to apply to the broad range of circumstances likely to be
confronted. Nevertheless, some suggestions for strengthening the guidance
to counsel during litigation are advanced in the conclusion.
For clarity, brevity, and convenience, when discussing evidence issues
this essay focuses primarily on the Federal Rules of Evidence, but mentions
state rules when they reinforce the analysis. In those areas of evidence law
where significant disagreement over important issues exists, the various
sides may be aired, but in most instances, there is substantial agreement
about the rules within our focus. Regardless, the attorney in each scenario
will be placed in a realistic predicament in which unresolved ethical
questions remain after application of all evidence and ethics rules.
The first scenario is drawn from a capital murder case7 :
Scenario 1. The socially prominent wife of a well-known physician
stands charged with capital murder. The charge arises out of the brutal
murder of her husband in their home by an individual allegedly hired by
the wife to kill the husband. The prosecution asserts that the wife was
motivated by her desire to obtain the husband's multimillion-dollar estate
7. See Wilson v. State, 690 So. 2d 449 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). In the interest of full
disclosure, I report that prior to the defendant's trial, I was retained by the defense attorneys
to brief them on several anticipated legal issues. I did not represent, counsel, or confer with
the defendant in any way; I did not attend the trial; and I never directly or indirectly heard
any confidential client communications. I disclose no defense secrets; in fact, I was not
exposed to such secrets. In effect, I viewed my role as a "law consultant." See Tanina
Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants, " 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1397, 1398 (2006)




and to continue her sexual liaisons with several men. Both the husband-
victim and the wife are white. The prosecution will call a former
paramour to the stand to testify to the liaisons. The witness is African-
American, 8 and he was married, with children, at the time of his sexual
liaisons with the defendant.
The second scenario was developed from several rape prosecutions 9 :
Scenario 2. A man is charged with rape, based on a woman's allegation
that she was raped by an acquaintance during a date. She reported to the
police that she and the man had been dating rather frequently for some
period of time, and that the man sexually assaulted her when they returned
to her home from a social event. During an ensuing police interrogation,
the accused insisted that the sexual acts were consensual. He stated that
after the sexual relations an argument ensued, and he departed. Shortly
thereafter, she called the police and accused the man of rape.
To prove that the allegation is false, the defense will call a witness to
prove that the prosecutrix made a previous false claim of rape. Both the
current defendant and the prosecutrix are white. The potential witness is
African-American. 10 He will testify to a similar experience with the
prosecutrix when they were dating.
In each scenario, the opposing side will object to the offer of the
potentially prejudicial evidence. The objection to the evidence will be
overruled by the judge, and the opposing party will then offer to stipulate
the relevant, essential details. A stipulation, as used in this context, is
simply an agreement between litigating parties resolving an issue in the
case.11 A stipulation serves as proof and dispenses with the need to prove
8. These facts closely track the actual facts from which the scenario was developed.
The interracial nature of several adulterous relationships was seen by some observers as a
potentially pernicious factor in the Wilson case. See, e.g., Jim Schutze, By Two and Two 56,
254 (1995) (characterizing one of the witnesses, an African-American, who had engaged in
extramarital affairs with the defendant, as the State's "biggest gun in the entire trial"); id. at
258 (reciting cross-examination of the witness by a defense attorney: "Does it offend you
that [the prosecutor] brought you here all the way from California because he thinks it's
important for the jury to see that you are black?"). Although the Schutze book is a true-
crime novel, it does provide support for certain factual and procedural aspects of the trial that
otherwise are difficult to document at this late date other than by personal memories. Other
writers have noted the use of race by attorneys. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues
Raised by Rape Trials, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1585, 1587 (2007) ("[P]laying upon prejudices
[of race or gender bias], particularly those of the American juror, is the trial attorney's bread
and butter.").
9. See State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402 (Iowa 2006); State v. Baker, 679 N.W.2d 7
(Iowa 2004). The facts were modified or embellished as necessary to make the issues in
Scenario 2 mirror the issues in Scenario 1.
10. The interracial factor is incorporated to mirror closely Scenario 1, which essentially
is drawn from the actual facts of the Wilson case. Other characteristics, such as
socioeconomic factors, extensive tattoos, or body piercings could be substituted. The
inclusion of such factors is not intended to offend, but to inject a factor that might prejudice
a litigant in the minds of some jurors. The defense in the Wilson case argued exactly that
point. See supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 828 N.E.2d 247, 256 (Ill. 2005).
1644 [Vol. 76
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the facts by other means, 12 conclusively establishing the facts contained
within them. 13  Stipulations, if appropriately drafted, thus eliminate
unnecessary consumption of time by proving facts not disputed, and they
may protect potential witnesses from needless embarrassment. Pertinent to
this essay, stipulations prove the relevant facts without their more salient,
irrelevant, and potentially prejudicial aspects biasing the jury.
Courts have reasons to favor stipulations-namely because they simplify
issues, expedite trials, and reduce prejudice and costs. 14 Yet, although
courts may favor stipulations, they are unlikely to force parties to stipulate
essential facts. Even when a party seeks to stipulate to certain relevant
facts, the court nevertheless may permit the opposing party to prove those
facts despite the proffered stipulation. 15 Courts generally recognize that
stipulations may not be as effective in presenting facts to juries-or even
trial judges-as in-court testimony and other evidence. 16 Therefore, the
courts customarily allow the parties "a large measure of discretion in
deciding to accept or reject an offer to stipulate."' 7 Furthermore, in the
criminal context, courts are not empowered to compel criminal defendants
to stipulate facts, and they normally do not require prosecutors to stipulate
important facts.' 8
12. See, e.g., id.; State v. Stevens, 153 P.3d 903, 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that, "once a defendant enters into a stipulation, he or she waives the right to require the
government to prove its case on the stipulated element").
13. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997) ("Old Chief's
proffered admission would, in fact, have been not merely relevant but seemingly conclusive
evidence of the element."); Woods, 828 N.E.2d at 256.
14. See, e.g., In re Estate of Moss, 248 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Il1. App. Ct. 1969); 1
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:17, at 675 (3d ed.
2007) ("Stipulations can be a promising way to eliminate unnecessary risks of prejudice.").
15. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (noting that the proffered stipulation of identity "need not have been accepted by the
government"); Espinal v. Arias, 916 A.2d 1081, 1086-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(holding that the trial court erred by requiring a party "to effectively stipulate to its own
expert's credentials").
16. Old Chief 519 U.S. at 187 (accepting as "unquestionably true" a lower court's
observation that a stipulation might "'rob the evidence of much of its fair and legitimate
weight' (quoting Dunning v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 39 A. 352, 356 (Me. 1897)). The Court
held that "[a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no
match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it." Id. at 189; see also
Washington, 705 F.2d at 498-99.
17. Washington, 705 F.2d at 499; see also State v. Francis, 145 P.3d 48, 65 (Kan. 2006)
(noting that "an offer to stipulate by either party to a criminal action need not be accepted by
the other").
18. See, e.g., Old Chief 519 U.S. at 186-87 (recognizing "the familiar, standard rule that
the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly,
that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force
of the case as the Government chooses to present it," but requiring prosecutors to accept
certain stipulations addressing prior criminal convictions); United States v. McCourt, 468
F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant's stipulation to the content of child
pornography images did not prevent the prosecution from introducing a number of the video
clips into evidence); United States v. Walker, 428 F.3d 1165, 1168 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Old
Chief explicitly reaffirmed the rule that under most circumstances the prosecution is entitled
to prove its case as it sees fit, and a criminal defendant may not 'stipulate or admit his way
1645
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Yet proving the events by alternative means will raise, perhaps
unnecessarily, both evidence and ethics issues. Should the other party
reject the offered stipulation and proceed to present the evidence of motive
or prior false claim, while the testimony may be relevant, the jury will
likely draw prejudicial inferences not only from the conduct of the party on
previous occasions but also from the characteristics of the witness. It is the
dilemma of introducing collateral, perhaps unnecessary, evidence with its
prejudicial nature or accepting a stipulation, which may be less effective in
proving the party's case, that underlies the focus of this essay.
I. SCENARIO I
In Scenario 1, the prosecution seeks to prove that the defendant was
motivated to murder her husband because-at least in part-she was
engaging in extramarital sexual liaisons. Although relevant and potentially
admissible, 19 motive is not an element of the offense of murder. 20 Thus, the
prosecution is entitled, but not required, to prove motive. In a number of
cases, courts have accepted evidence of extramarital affairs as proof of
motive in homicide cases, 2 1 although some courts guard against its
misuse. 22
out' of the full evidentiary force of the case against him." (quoting Old Chief 519 U.S. at
186)); Franklin v. State, No. SC04-1267, 2007 WL 1774414, at *11 (Fla. June 21, 2007)
(upholding the trial court's rejection of the defense's offer to stipulate prior offenses in a
capital murder sentencing proceeding, and permitting the prosecution to present certain
details of those convictions through the testimony of witnesses); Francis, 145 P.3d at 65
(noting that "an offer to stipulate by either party to a criminal action need not be accepted by
the other").
19. See, e.g., People v. Buck, 838 N.E.2d 187, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) ("[W]hile the
prosecution is not obligated to prove motive, the State may introduce evidence that tends to
show that an accused has a motive for killing the deceased."); Gawn v. State, 7 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 19, 25 (1896) ("[T]he question of motive necessarily forces itself upon the mind in the
investigation of every alleged criminal act.").
20. See, e.g., People v. Thornton, 161 P.3d 3, 38 (Cal. 2007) (discussing the trial court's
instruction in a capital murder prosecution that "'[m]otive is not an element of the crime
charged and need not be shown' (quoting Cal. Jury Instr.-Crim. 2.51 (5th ed. 1988)));
Belcher v. State, 961 So. 2d 239, 249 (Fla. 2007) (noting that "motive is not a required
element of first-degree murder"); Commonwealth v. Colon, 866 N.E.2d 412, 428 n.17
(Mass. 2007) ("The jury need not have found any motive on the part of the defendant in
order to convict him of murder in the first degree."); State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 453
(Ohio 1992) ("Motive, in criminal law, is not an element of the crime.").
21. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding the admission of extramarital sexual affairs evidence, and opining that the prior
bad acts exceptions "are not to be construed narrowly"); People v. Smith, 203 P. 816, 821
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) ("No rule is more firmly established than that, upon the trial for
murder of husband or wife, evidence tending to show illicit relations of the accused with
another is admissible to show lack of love and affection for the defendant's lawful spouse.");
Givens v. State, 546 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 2001) (holding that evidence of a "close
relationship" between defendant and a man was relevant to the homicide and therefore
admissible); Andrew v. State, 164 P.3d 176, 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (upholding
evidence of defendant's extramarital sexual affairs as "relevant to prove motive");
Commonwealth v. Heller, 87 A.2d 287, 289-90 (Pa. 1952) (approving the use of evidence of
adultery to show a motive for murder); State v. Johnson, 743 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tenn. 1987)
1646 [Vol. 76
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While the prosecution can offer evidence in order to prove a motive, and
though some courts view motive evidence as quite probative of guilt,23
proof of motive alone does not establish guilt. 24 Instead, motive serves as
circumstantial evidence showing that a particular person had a reason to
commit a criminal offense. 25 Put in context, testimony that the wife had
extramarital affairs perhaps supports the prosecution's assertion that she
had a motive to kill her husband, but it does not prove that she in fact did
kill him. Other evidence is necessary to prove the murder and the
defendant's culpability in the murder; the testimony about extramarital
affairs only goes to prove the adultery.26
Turning our attention to the specific type of character evidence at issue in
Scenario 1, modern evidence rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
specifically authorize the use of character evidence to prove motive when
(upholding admission of evidence of defendant's extramarital affair as tending "to bear upon
appellant's possible motive for the homicide and his relationship with the victim"); Reaves
v. State, 970 S.W.2d 111, 119 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding "within the 'zone of reasonable
disagreement"' and therefore upholding the trial court's ruling that evidence of the
defendant's extramarital affair was admissible (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d
372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 328, 337 (Va. Ct.
App. 1988) (upholding the admission of sexual relationship evidence as "probative of a
motive for the murder"). Even evidence of conduct subsequent to the murder may be
admissible. See, e.g., People v. Branion, 265 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ill. 1970) (upholding the
admission of testimony about the defendant's visit to an alleged paramour's apartment the
day after the homicide "because it tended to prove motive"); State v. Booker, 434 P.2d 801,
807-08 (Kan. 1967) (upholding the use of testimony about the defendant's behavior
subsequent to the homicide).
One court, though, has noted that "[t]here is a general paucity of cases throughout the
country discussing the issue of adultery as evidence of motive to kill one's spouse." Camm
v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Nevertheless, as the Reaves court
noted, "In the common experience of mankind, this is an oft repeated motive for homicide."
970 S.W.2d at 118. But cf Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 87 (Ky. 2006)
("'Evidence of immorality would not tend to prove a propensity or predisposition to commit
homicide."' (quoting Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 449 (Ky. 1999))).
22. See, e.g., Camm, 812 N.E.2d at 1127 (reversing defendant's conviction of three
counts of murder based upon the court's view that under the facts of the case, the
prosecution's evidence of the defendant's adulterous conduct was impermissible character
evidence and not proper evidence of a motive for murder); Lesley v. State, 606 So. 2d 1084
(Miss. 1992) (reversing the conspiracy to murder conviction because the trial court erred in
permitting the prosecution to present evidence of the defendant's extramarital affairs which
the court deemed remote, irrelevant, and prejudicial).
23. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 200 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App. 2006) ("Evidence
showing motive to commit murder is a significant circumstance indicating guilt, and it is
therefore relevant and admissible."); Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004) ("Motive is a significant circumstance indicating guilt.").
24. See State v. Nichols, 689 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("Motive alone is
insufficient to convict.").
25. See id. ("Motive is a mental state which induces an act; it is a circumstantial fact
used to strengthen an inference, drawn from other evidence, that an act was done [by the
accused]."); Baker v. State, 97 N.W. 566, 570 (Wis. 1903) ("Motive is the reason which
leads the mind to desire that result.").
26. See Lesley, 606 So. 2d at 1090 (noting similarly that, "[a]t best, prior extramarital
affairs of [the defendant] may have proven her propensity to have another affair").
2007] 1647
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motive is a pertinent consideration. 27 Other bad acts evidence is a common
form of the character evidence used to prove motive, 28 although if offered
to prove propensity, other bad acts evidence generally is not admissible. 29
In this scenario, testimony about the extramarital affairs obviously
constitutes evidence of other bad acts.
The prosecution likely will need to give notice to the defense that it
intends to proffer the evidence, 30 and upon receiving the notice, the defense
will seek to prevent its use by filing a motion in limine. The defense will
argue a number of reasons why the evidence is inadmissible. These reasons
are identified and discussed in the remaining portion of this part.
Although modem rules of evidence generally favor the admissibility of
evidence, character evidence offered to prove conforming conduct generally
is not admissible. 31 Naturally, there are exceptions to the general rule; 32
some character evidence is admissible. 33
Character evidence ordinarily is disfavored, though, for a number of
reasons. 34 It provides slight probative value, and carries a significant
potential for unfair prejudice. 35 Because of its circumstantial nature in that
27. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts... may... be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive ... .
28. Id.
29. Id. ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.").
30. See id.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... may ... be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive.., provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
31. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) (stating that, except as otherwise provided in the Rule,
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion").
32. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1)-(3) (stating exceptions to the Rule). Moreover, if
character is an element at issue, Rule 404 does not bar its use because the Rule generally
prohibits only character evidence offered to "prove action in conformity" with the actor's
asserted character or character trait.
33. See, e.g., id. (stating exceptions to the general rule of exclusion); Fed. R. Evid.
405(b) (authorizing the use of specific instances evidence if character is "an essential
element of a charge, claim, or defense"); United States v. Franco, 484 F.3d 347, 352 (6th
Cir. 2007) (observing that, in a case involving the subjective form of entrapment, "[b]ecause
predisposition is relevant to entrapment, such character evidence was an essential element of
Franco's defense, and therefore, these specific instances of his conduct were admissible");
World Wide Ass'n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006)
(noting that "it is well-established ... that the character of the plaintiff in a defamation case
is at issue"). For a general discussion on the issue of entrapment, see Joseph A. Colquitt,
Rethinking Entrapment, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1389 (2004).
34. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (listing a number of
reasons for rejecting character evidence (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
475-76 (1948))).
35. Addressing "unfair prejudice" with respect to criminal defendants, the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that the term "speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence
1648 [Vol. 76
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it is not directly probative of the issues in the case, it also has the potential
to distract and/or confuse a jury. There is also the concern that juries may
punish people for their bad character (or reward people for their good
character) rather than for the conduct that is the basis of the charge or the
defense. Additionally, the presentation of character evidence takes time and
may unduly extend the trial.
The court, upon being apprised of the prosecution's proffer and upon
receipt of the defense's motion in limine, must decide whether or not to
allow the presentation of the evidence. When a party seeks to introduce
other bad acts evidence as proof of motive, a trial court generally will use a
three-step process to determine its admissibility. First, the court will decide
whether the proffered evidence is offered for a proper purpose pursuant to
Rule 404(b). 36 Second, the court will determine whether the evidence is
relevant. Third, the court will determine whether any undue prejudice
exists that would substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence
through application of the Rule 403 balancing test.
The inquiry into proper purpose is rather narrow. The proffering party
bears the responsibility of identifying a proper purpose for the evidence. In
Scenario 1, this is not a difficult task because Rule 404(b) expressly
provides the answer in this instance. It specifically lists proof of motive as
a legitimate exception to the general exclusion of character evidence.
If the court determines that the purpose for which the prosecutor offers
the evidence is legitimate, it must next address a second issue, namely,
whether the evidence is relevant. 37  Although the party offering the
evidence may assert a proper purpose, such as motive, it is for the court to
say whether the evidence, if admitted, would in fact serve that purpose.
If the proffered evidence would not shed light on the issue of motive, it is
not relevant and therefore should not be admitted.38  If, though, the
evidence would tend to prove or disprove motive, it is relevant and,
to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the
offense charged." Id. at 180.
36. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) ("The threshold
inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is
whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character."). The Court in
Huddleston also stated that, "first, . . . Rule 404(b) [requires] that the evidence be offered for
a proper purpose." Id. at 691; see also United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.
2001); United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 2001). Although the issue in Hill
was the use of prior convictions to prove intent, and in Tan it was prior crimes evidence
offered to prove malice, rather than other bad acts evidence addressed to motive, the decision
process remains the same.
37. See, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689 ("Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)
only if it is relevant."); Tan, 254 F.3d at 1207; Hill, 249 F.3d at 710; Reaves v. State, 970
S.W.2d 111, 118 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting that the proffer of motive evidence pursuant to
Rule 404(b) "calls for a trial judge to make a rule 401 relevancy determination").
38. See, e.g., State v. Osier, 569 N.W.2d 441, 443-44 (N.D. 1997) (reversing the
defendant's conviction based on a finding that "[a]dmission of the niece's testimony to show
motive .. cannot withstand scrutiny under Rule 404(b)" and concluding that the witness's
"testimony was not relevant to a genuine issue regarding motive, scheme, plan, or any other
listed exception under Rule 404(b)").
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pursuant to Rule 404(b), at least conditionally admissible. This issue stands
quite apart from the determination of whether the evidence is being offered
for an appropriate purpose.
That which is relevant is admissible, 39 and it does not require much for
evidence to be relevant. Succinctly stated, evidence is deemed relevant if it
tends to prove or disprove a matter in dispute. 40 Given the relatively low
threshold evidence must satisfy to be relevant, and in light of the fact that
motive ordinarily is viewed as relevant in homicide cases, the court might
tend to rule that the proffered evidence is admissible despite its troubling
nature.4 1 But before deciding to admit the evidence the court must address
yet another issue.
In addition to the previously mentioned deficiency 42 of the evidence to
prove complicity in the homicide, the evidence of adultery actually may
prove not only too little but also too much. Even though the court has
determined that the evidence is offered for a proper purpose and is relevant,
the court must proceed to the third prong of the test, and conduct a
weighing of its probative value and its potential for undue prejudice,
confusion, or other factors of concern pursuant to Rule 403.4 3 Although
39. See Fed. R. Evid. 402.
40. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). State rules define
relevance in the same or quite similar language. See, e.g., Ala. R. Evid. 401 (using the same
language); Mich. R. Evid. 401 (same); People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456, 460 (N.Y. 1977)
(same (quoting Unif. Rule of Evidence 401)). Thus, courts may permit evidence that "tends
to show" a fact in issue. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 632 (Ohio 2006).
41. In addition to the low threshold for relevancy, trial judges also exercise broad
discretion in determining whether the evidence-including motive evidence-is relevant.
See, e.g., Hill, 249 F.3d at 710 (noting that courts "generally review the admission of Rule
404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion"); People v. Norwood, 841 N.E.2d 514, 522 (I11.
App. Ct. 2005) (upholding use of other crimes evidence to show motive, noting that the
question of admissibility is "left to the trial court's sound discretion," and upholding the
decision to admit the evidence "absent a clear abuse of discretion"); Reaves, 970 S.W.2d at
119 (declining to find abuse of discretion in the admission of evidence of an extramarital
affair, and observing that "trial courts are given a limited right to be wrong as long as their
decision is not 'arbitrary and capricious"'). Moreover, an appellate court will not overrule
the trial court's decision unless the trial court's ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., State v. Barnes, 657 A.2d 611, 615 (Conn. 1995) ("Every reasonable presumption
should be made in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling in determining whether there
has been an abuse of discretion."); State v. Stephen F., 152 P.3d 842, 844 (N.M. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in barring testimony tending to prove
the witness's motive to lie); Craig, 853 N.E.2d at 633 (concluding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting other bad acts evidence). The court's discretion, though,
does not authorize the court to ignore the rules. Thus, although Rule 404(b) states that
motive evidence "may ... be admissible," that phrase does not establish in the courts the
discretion to reject motive evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee note ("[I]t
is anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may
exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e., prejudice,
confusion or waste of time.").
42. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
43. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988) ("[P]rotection
against such unfair prejudice emanates.., from the assessment the trial court must make
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relevant, the evidence is not admissible even for a permissible purpose if,
for example, it would unfairly prejudice the opposing party, confuse the
fact-finder, or unduly prolong the proceedings.44 The mere fact that the
evidence may prove injurious to the opposing party, though, is not an
adequate reason to reject the evidence; 45 the issue is whether the potential
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
Rather than merely proving the existence of a motive, it also proves a
character fault-such as promiscuity or immorality-which potentially
could be used by the jury to find that the defendant is an immoral or evil
person, and that as a bad person she is more likely to commit criminal acts
such as murder than is a person of good character. 46 In other words, the
evidence of extramarital affairs may be used inappropriately by the jury as
character evidence to show a propensity to engage in criminal activity.47
This use, though, while factually possible, is legally impermissible.
Therefore, if the jury uses the evidence to find that the wife is a person of
evil nature, and thereby is more likely to have engaged in a homicide than if
she had been a person of good character, the jury is using the bad acts
evidence admitted to show motive to support a finding that she had a
propensity to act in conformity with her bad character.
Nevertheless, because the courts ordinarily permit evidence of
extramarital affairs to prove motive, the court likely will decide the three
prongs-purpose, relevancy, and prejudice-of the test in favor of the
prosecution, 48 and the court will deny the motion in limine.
under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice."); United States v. Tan, 254
F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001); Hill, 249 F.3d at 710, 713; Reaves, 970 S.W.2d at 118
(noting that motive evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is subject to a Rule 403
inquiry).
44. Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
45. See, e.g., State v. West, 149 A.2d 217, 221 (N.J. 1959) (pre-Rule 403 case stating
"[t]hat evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is
a significant part of the proof').
46. See United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.)
("Although . . . 'propensity evidence' is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes
other than those charged-or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad
person deserves punishment-creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance,"
quoted in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997)). But cf Greene v.
Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 87 (Ky. 2006) ("Evidence of immorality would not tend to
prove a propensity or predisposition to commit homicide.").
47. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion ... ").
48. See, e.g., People v. Norwood, 841 N.E.2d 514, 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (upholding
use of other crimes evidence to show motive and noting that the question of admissibility is
"left to the trial court's sound discretion," and upholding the admission of evidence "absent a
clear abuse of discretion"); Reaves, 970 S.W.2d at 119 (declining to find abuse of discretion
in the admission of evidence of an extramarital affair, and observing that "trial courts are
given a limited right to be wrong as long as their decision is not 'arbitrary and capricious"').
1651
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The prosecution will attempt to call as a witness an African-American
man who, as previously stated, while married, engaged in sexual relations
with the defendant. By calling the adulterer as a witness, perhaps
unnecessarily, the prosecutor-intentionally or unintentionally-plays the
"race card," i.e., perhaps gratuitously supplying the jury with the race of the
person with whom the defendant engaged in sexual activity, thus distracting
the jury with extraneous and potentially prejudicial information.49 Both the
defendant and the witness seemingly will be impacted significantly by the
prosecutor's decision to offer evidence on the issue of motive.
At this point, in order to prevent the prosecution from presenting such a
controversial witness, the defense will proffer a stipulation that the
defendant engaged in several extramarital affairs in what she called an
"open marriage." By offering the stipulation, the defense counsel has once
again injected a new variable that must be considered by both the
prosecutor and the judge.50
It is unlikely that the court will require the prosecution to accept the
stipulation, though sometimes, a court may do exactly that. One occasion
for such a ruling involves the use of prior convictions. For example, in Old
Chief v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that, in federal
prosecutions, if a past conviction constitutes an element of the offense for
But see Camm v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing defendant's
conviction of three counts of murder based upon the court's view that under the facts of the
case, the prosecution's evidence of the defendant's adulterous conduct was impermissible
character evidence and not proper evidence of a motive for murder); Lesley v. State, 606 So.
2d 1084 (Miss. 1992) (reversing the conspiracy to murder conviction because the trial court
erred in permitting the prosecution to present evidence of the defendant's extramarital affairs
which the court deemed remote, irrelevant, and prejudicial).
49. The significance of "playing the race card" has been recognized by a number of
courts since it was propelled into prominence in the O.J. Simpson case. See, e.g., F.J.W.
Enters., Inc. v. Johnson, 746 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that "[t]his
[the race card] has become a 'buzz word,' since the O.J. Simpson case, indicating that one
has unnecessarily and improperly inserted the issue of race into a case"); see also People v.
Houston-Irving, No. 035071, 2006 WL 2105875, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2006)
(discussing an argument by counsel specifically accusing the other attorney of playing the
race card by accusing a witness "of being a racist"); Calloway v. State, 784 A.2d 636 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (discussing final arguments in which both sides addressed the "race
card" issue).
50. See, e.g., Old Chief 519 U.S. at 182-84.
As for the analytical method to be used in Rule 403 balancing.., a second
approach would start out like the first but be ready to go further. On objection, the
court would decide whether a particular item of evidence raised a danger of unfair
prejudice. If it did, the judge would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative
value and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but for any actually
available substitutes as well. If an alternative were found to have substantially the
same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound
judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it
if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly
prejudicial risk .... [A] judge applying Rule 403 could reasonably apply some
discount to the probative value of an item of evidence when faced with less risky
alternative proof going to the same point ....
Id. at 182-83. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 401 explicitly state that a party's
concession is pertinent to the court's discretion to exclude evidence on the point conceded).
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which the defendant is charged, the defendant can stipulate to the fact of the
conviction, and thereby prevent the prosecution from proving the
conviction by other means. 51 The Court in Old Chief though, emphasized
the fact that prosecutors must be allowed to prove their cases by "colorful"
evidence, 52 and, as a result, courts have been slow to embrace the Old Chief
holding, while a number of courts have sought to apply it narrowly. 53 For
example, many courts view the Old Chief ruling as addressing only prior
conviction evidence and not as reaching other bad acts evidence. 54
Therefore, in practice, prosecutors need not accept defense-offered
stipulations, 55 and the decision of whether to accept or reject the stipulation
effectively will rest solely with the prosecutor.
Even if the evidence is admissible, a significant question remains,
namely, should the prosecutor offer it? Prosecuting attorneys who believe
the evidence supports the guilt of an accused have every reason to seek a
conviction. But in seeking a conviction, the prosecutor still plays a role in
ensuring that the defendant' receives a fair trial, 56 as prosecutors bear
additional, special responsibilities.
Prosecutors are expected to prosecute their cases forcefully, but only
while being fair to the accused.57 Alternatively speaking, prosecutors must
seek both to convict the guilty and to exonerate the innocent. 58 Thus,
51. Id. at 174.
52. Id. at 186-87.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
"the rationale for the limited rule of Old Chief disappears" when a stipulation addresses an
element of the crime rather than the defendant's criminal status); State v. Ball, 756 So. 2d
275, 278-80 (La. 1999) (stating a number of reasons for distinguishing and refusing to
follow Old Chie).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(reviewing Old Chief and holding "that a defendant's offer to stipulate to an element of an
offense does not render the government's other crimes evidence inadmissible under Rule
404(b) to prove that element, even if the defendant's proposed stipulation is unequivocal");
see also Hill, 249 F.3d at 713. In Old Chief the Court noted that, "[i]n sum, the accepted
rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to
stipulate the evidence away rests on good sense." 519 U.S. at 189.
55. See Old Chief 519 U.S. at 183 ("[A] defendant's Rule 403 objection offering to
concede a point generally cannot prevail over the Government's choice to offer evidence
showing guilt and all the circumstances surrounding the offense."); Ball, 756 So. 2d at 280
(noting that to force the prosecution to accept a proffered defense stipulation would frustrate
the general rule that "' [t]he State cannot be robbed of the moral force of its case merely
because the stipulation is offered"' (quoting State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321, 1326 (La.
1984))).
56. See State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 452, 455 (Conn. 1921) ("If the accused be guilty, he
should none the less be convicted only after a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the
sound and well-established rules which the laws prescribe.").
57. See Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1958) (noting that federal
prosecutors bear the dual duties to prosecute zealously and to be fair to the accused);
Ferrone, 113 A. at 455 (observing that prosecutors engaged in litigation "should be forceful,
but fair"); People v. Pelchat, 464 N.E.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. 1984) (opining that a prosecutor
"owes a duty of fair dealing to the accused").
58. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (observing that federal
prosecutors represent the government, "whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done"); Ferrone, 113 A. at 455 (noting that
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prosecutors should prosecute their cases vigorously, but only if they believe
that justice will attend the convictions. 59 Moreover, in prosecuting cases,
vigorous though they may be, prosecutors should not violate rules or utilize
unfair methods. 60
In this instance, the motive evidence is highly prejudicial, not only
because it involves extramarital affairs, but also because of the multiracial
nature of the relationship. 61 Moreover, the probative value of adultery
evidence is drawn into question by data which fail to show that a significant
percentage of adulterers murder their spouses. Although marital infidelity
is widespread, few-comparatively very few-adulterers murder their
spouses. Therefore, in this instance, the probative value of motive evidence
is questionable, and the potential for undue prejudice is great.62
In assessing probative value, it is noteworthy that some cases and
scholarly writers opine that adultery is quite common.63  Courts and
prosecutors "seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent"); Pelchat, 464
N.E.2d at 451 (noting that prosecutors are "charged with the duty not only to seek
convictions but also to see that justice is done").
59. See Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function
Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict."); Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); Nat'l Prosecution
Standards Standard 1.1 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n, 2d ed. 1991) ("The primary responsibility
of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished."); see also Berger, 295 U.S. at 88
(observing that "the twofold aim of [federal prosecutors] is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer"); Handford, 249 F.2d at 296 (noting that federal prosecutors bear the dual
duties to prosecute zealously and to be fair to the accused); People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d
671, 683 (Colo. 2006) ("A district attorney is further bound by standards of conduct unique
to public prosecutors: her duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
60. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (noting that, "while [the prosecutor] may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one").
61. See supra note 8.
62. See Baker v. State, 97 N.W. 566, 569 (Wis. 1903). In this case, other bad acts
evidence was received by the trial court on the issue of fraudulent intent. The state supreme
court, in reversing the conviction, explained,
We now come to the errors assigned upon the admission of evidence, which are
very numerous, but not more so than is warranted by the extraordinary flights of
inquiry in which the trial court indulged the state's counsel. Much of the objected
testimony consisted of narratives of conversations with and conduct of the accused
on other and remote occasions, so interlarded with gossipy or scandalous
suggestion and innuendo as to indicate the purpose of the witnesses, if not of
counsel, to degrade and discredit her in the esteem of the jury. Any such attempt
on the part of counsel in the trial of any case, but especially of the attorney for the
state in a criminal prosecution, is highly improper, and should be promptly
checked by the trial court.... It is no more proof of the fraudulent intent than of
the other elements of the crime that accused is of loose morals or general dishonest
tendencies.
Id. at 569-70.
63. See, e.g., Jaunese v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
("Unfortunately, extramarital affairs are all too common in today's society."); Phyllis
Coleman, Who's Been Sleeping in My Bed? You and Me, and the State Makes Three, 24 Ind.
L. Rev. 399 n.2 (1991) ("[A]ffairs are extremely common." (quoting Luann Linquist, Secret
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scholars cite studies of the level of marital infidelity in legal and social
science literature to the effect that perhaps a majority of spouses engage in
extramarital sexual liaisons.64 The figures range from a high of 70% of
men and 50% of women cheating on their spouses65 to more conservative
estimates that 25% of married men and 15% of married women have
engaged in adultery. 66 Some of these statistics are challenged, 67 but even
the challengers note a significant level of adultery in America today. 68
Scholars estimate that about 2% of married couples view their marriage as
"open," which means that some 900,000 married couples are believed to be
in an "open marriage." 69
Therefore, despite its wide acceptance as circumstantial evidence of a
motive to kill, proof of extramarital affairs sheds little light on the actual
culpability vel non of the accused with regard to the homicide. Even if
Lovers, at xi (1989))); Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal
Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims' Rights, 76 Temp. L. Rev.
645, 679 (2003) ("Some studies show that today adultery is quite common .. ").
64. See, e.g., Jaunese, 701 N.E.2d at 1284 n.3 (citing statistics from articles, including
Coleman, supra note 63, and Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime &
the Constitution, 30 J. Fam. L. 45 (1991)); Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing
the Boundaries of Consent, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 165, 215 (2007) (observing that perhaps
fifty percent of married adults have committed adultery); Coleman, supra note 63, at 412
(noting that "a majority of married people have affairs"); Siegel, supra at 55 ("Most
American marriages include extramarital sex by at least one of the partners. Half of all
husbands report having committed adultery.... Somewhere between a third to forty percent
of all wives say they have been unfaithful .... "); Jennifer A. Herold, Note, A Breach of
Vows but Not Criminal: Does Lawrence v. Texas Invalidate Utah's Statute Criminalizing
Adultery?, 7 J. L. & Fam. Stud. 253 (2005) ("[Sltudies suggest that nearly fifty percent of
married men and women have engaged in adultery.").
65. See Coleman, supra note 63, at 399 n.2; Gruber, supra note 63, at 679 n.161
("According to one study, approximately 70% of married men cheat on their wives, and 50%
of married women cheat on their husbands."); Nehal A. Patel, Note, The State's Perpetual
Protection of Adultery: Examining Koestler v. Pollard and Wisconsin's Faded Adultery
Torts, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1013, 1015 ("The most reputable social science surveys reveal that
at least twenty to fifty percent of American adults admit to committing adultery, and some
studies estimate the adultery rate to be as high as seventy percent.").
66. See Bradford Bigler, Comment, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual
Misrepresentation as Adequate Provocation, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 783, 805 & n. 112 (2006)
(citing several studies and quoting one source to the effect that "adultery statistics are hotly
debated," noting a "relatively high incidence of marital infidelity," and providing
conservative estimates).
67. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the "No-Harm" Rule in Custody
Litigation, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 81, 93 (2002) ("The best evidence indicates that while the
incidence of marital infidelity is much lower than commonly described in tabloids,
supermarket check-stand magazines, and television talk shows, it nevertheless occurs in
many marriages."). Wardle quotes Tom Smith of the University of Chicago's National
Opinion Research Council, as opining that "[t]he best estimates are that about . . . 15-17% of
ever-married people have had a sexual partner other than their spouse while married." Id. at
94.
68. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 67, at 93 (noting that marital infidelity "occurs in many
marriages"). "[Ilit is fair to infer that somewhere between twenty-one and thirty-seven
percent of all married men and between twelve and twenty percent of all married women
will engage in sexual infidelity during their marriages." Id. at 95.




"only" one-third of husbands and one-fifth of wives engage in extramarital
sexual relations, the probative value of adultery evidence in homicide
prosecutions seems somewhat tenuous given the fact that few of these
adulterous spouses will kill their spouses. On the other hand, the public
strongly disapproves of adultery, 70 which potentially increases the
prejudicial nature of extramarital sexual liaisons evidence. Moreover, by
diverting the jury's attention from the principal issues, the evidence may
lead to confusion or erroneous fact-finding.
In light of these deficiencies, and because modem rules of evidence are
biased in favor of the admissibility of evidence 7 1-such that the majority of
courts will permit the use of other acts adultery evidence regardless of those
deficits-should the prosecutor take it upon herself to reconsider use of the
evidence before presenting it to the jury? And if so, what guidance does
she have, absent explicit instruction in the rules, to decide whether to accept
the stipulation?72 Alternatively, should she proffer the evidence and leave
it to the court to mitigate its prejudicial nature?
The only real tool available to the court to mitigate the prejudice, outside
of accepting the stipulation, is a limiting instruction, 73 the utility of which is
70. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 64, at 55-56 ("Despite the prevalence of extramarital
activity, the vast majority of people criticize departures from monogamy: 'In the latest
available survey, 87% said that extramarital relations were "always wrong" or almost always
wrong."' (quoting Lynn Atwater, The Extramarital Connection 15 (1982))); Wardle, supra
note 67, at 95 ("Opinion surveys also indicate that even in today's 'liberated' sexual
atmosphere, most Americans still consider adultery to be immoral."); Herold, supra note 64,
at 253 (noting that "the majority of Americans find adultery morally wrong"); Gabrielle
Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 39
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 837, 839 n.19 (2006) ("Unless a married person is separated from his or
her spouse, nine in [ten] people believe it's always or at least almost always wrong to have
sex with someone else." (quoting a USA Today/CNN/Gallop poll) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that
"exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 that is otherwise admissible under the other rules 'is
an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly' (internal quotation marks omitted));
Lopez v. State, 200 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Tex. App. 2006) (observing that the "court should
favor admission in close cases" when courts weigh evidence pursuant to Rule 403).
72. She also has the option to offer an alternative stipulation of the single witness in lieu
of calling that witness, and then persisting with the presentation of other evidence of the
defendant's adultery.
73. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988) (noting that the
protection against undue prejudice emanates from the availability of a limiting instruction
which informs the jury that "similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper
purpose for which it was admitted"). Limiting instructions are addressed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 105. Cautionary instructions are normally given only when requested by a party,
and the failure to give limiting instructions sua sponte rarely will be deemed error. See, e.g.,
Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 820 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that, in
absence of a request for a limiting instruction, the court reverses only for the "very high
standard" of plain error); Exparte Martin, 931 So. 2d 759, 760 (Ala. 2004) (holding that the
failure to give a limiting instruction absent a request did not constitute plain error); State v.
Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 41 (Wash. 2007) (observing that "the failure of a court to give a limiting
instruction is not error when no instruction was requested"). Attorneys in the exercise of
professional judgment may elect not to request such an instruction for a number of reasons.
See, e.g., State v. Wach, 24 P.3d 948, 953 (Utah 2001) (noting that the trial court offered to
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questionable at best.74 Despite the potential for such misuse of evidence by
the fact-finders, and the perceived ineffectiveness of cautionary
instructions, courts still seemingly emphasize the presumption of
admissibility, especially when prejudicial evidence is accompanied by a
limiting instruction.75 Nonetheless, this approach permits evidence that
carries with it a heightened level of unfair prejudice to be routinely
introduced to juries who may not restrict the evidence to its court-
designated purpose.76
The question, then, is how does the prosecutor act as a minister of justice
if she rejects a stipulation that would establish the fact of extramarital
affairs without injecting the issue of race or causing needless harm to a
witness? The short answer may be that she does not.
give a curative instruction, but that the defendant's attorney declined the offer and argued an
instruction likely would emphasize the matter to the jury). Yet if the evidence is
significantly prejudicial, the court should consider giving a cautionary instruction sua sponte
unless the prejudiced party objects. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir.
2007) (observing that "counsel might reasonably conclude that such an instruction might
inadvertently call attention to the evidence of prior bad acts"). The failure to give a
cautionary instruction sua sponte, though, may be error in some instances. See, e.g., People
v. Pichardo, 825 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 2006) (referring to the statement of a
nontestifying codefendant, the court stated that, "[a]lthough defendant did not request a
limiting instruction, we conclude under the circumstances of this case that the failure to give
such an instruction is a fundamental error that warrants reversal and a new trial").
74. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury,
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." (citations omitted)). Nevertheless,
the prosecutor might consider a limiting instruction as a tool to mitigate the impact of the
motive evidence if she is weighing its impact. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee
note (noting that, "[in reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair
prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of
effectiveness of a limiting instruction").
75. It also should be noted that when attorneys, prosecutors, or judges are assessing the
potential prejudicial impact of evidence prior to offering or admitting the evidence, the
efficacy of a limiting instruction is difficult to measure in light of the fact that the party
against whom the evidence is offered may either choose not to request a cautionary
instruction or oppose the giving of such an instruction. See, e.g., Wach, 24 P.3d at 953
(noting that the trial court offered to give a curative instruction, but that the defendant's
attorney declined the offer and argued an instruction likely would emphasize the matter to
the jury).
76. See Peter W. Agnes, Jr., An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: A
Collaborative Approach to Eliminate Improper Closing Arguments, 87 Mass L. Rev. 33, 40
(2002).
In another context, then Justice Hennessey of the Supreme Judicial Court
observed that courts should be "skeptical as to the effectiveness of limiting
instructions" in circumstances in which the evidence has a high potential for unfair
prejudice. Yet despite the fact that the problem of ineffectual curative instructions
has been known to exist for many years and there is an emerging body of empirical
data that indicates that curative instructions do not work, appellate courts continue
to presume that curative instructions repair the harm caused by improper
arguments.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 308 N.E.2d 538, 546 (Mass. 1974) (Hennessey, J.,
concurring)).
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II. SCENARIO 2
In Scenario 2, the defense seeks to prove that the prosecuting witness (the
prosecutrix) has falsely accused the defendant of rape. The defense will
offer evidence of a prior false accusation of rape by the prosecutrix against
another man both to discredit her as a witness and to show that she had a
motive (i.e., anger, retaliation) to lie about the accused when she claimed
that he had raped her.
As in the first scenario, in compliance with the requirement of the
jurisdiction's rape-shield provision,77 the defense will give notice of its
intent to present evidence of the prior false claim. During cross-
examination of the prosecutrix, the defense will attempt to impeach the
prosecutrix by asking her about the previous false claim of rape.78 If she
admits the fact that she falsely accused a person of rape on a different
occasion, her testimony is at least partially discredited and the jury will be
instructed that they can use the admission of the prior false claim against
her when weighing the believability of her testimony. The defense, though,
will further press the issue during its case by calling as a witness the man
falsely accused by the prosecutrix on the previous occasion, who will testify
that he dated the woman for a period of time and that on a previous
occasion she claimed he had raped her. He will say that after engaging in
consensual sexual relations, they had an argument. He departed, and she
called the police and had him arrested. The charges were later dropped
when she recanted her accusation and refused to cooperate with the
prosecution.
The prosecution will seek to prevent the use of the evidence by filing a
motion in limine, and will argue that the evidence is not admissible
pursuant to the jurisdiction's rape-shield law. Moreover, if the judge
determines that the evidence is not precluded by the rape-shield law, the
State will argue that even though relevant, its probative value is
significantly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The prejudice, according
to the prosecutor, comes not only from the evidence of prior bad acts by the
prosecutrix, which are not directly connected with the present charge of
rape, but also from the multiracial nature of the prosecutrix's prior
relationship with the proposed witness. 79
Just as in Scenario 1, upon the initial objection by the prosecutor, the
judge will have to determine the admissibility of the evidence. Three issues
attend that effort. First, the rape-shield law may prevent the use of the
evidence. Second, insofar as the evidence is used for impeachment,
77. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412(c)(1)(A) (notice requirement); Ala. R. Evid. 412(d)(1)
(same); Wash. R. Evid. 412(d)(1)(A) (same).
78. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) ("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness... may... in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness .... ").
79. See supra note 10 (identifying the reason for the inclusion of race in the scenario).
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extrinsic evidence of prior conduct generally is not admissible. 80 Third, for
the purposes of our analysis, the prosecutrix will already have admitted
during cross-examination that she falsely accused another man of rape.
Thus, the man's testimony is redundant and arguably unnecessary.
Again, as already discussed with regard to motive evidence in Scenario 1,
the judge will determine and weigh the purpose, relevancy, and potential
prejudice of the evidence before admitting the evidence. Because similar
testing of the evidence was discussed with regard to Scenario 1,81 that
discussion will not be repeated here. Scenario 2, though, does present an
additional issue, namely the impact of rape-shield law.
At least to some extent, modem rules of evidence protect the victim of a
crime from an a'ssault on his or her character by the criminal defendant.
Although Rule 404(a)(2) does permit a criminal defendant to introduce
certain pertinent types of character evidence to attack a victim's allegations,
Rule 412's more stringent victim protection prevails in sex-offense cases
such as Scenario 2.
While rape-shield 'rules vary by jurisdiction, the statutes or rules
generally prohibit the use of a victim's character propensity evidence
involving sexual conduct in litigation, including the sexual history of the
alleged victim of a rape or other sexual assault.82 These rules exist in the
federal system 83 and across the states 84 to protect victims of rape or other
sexual offenses from the humiliation of having their sexual history
presented in a public forum.85 Where the history is unrelated to the charge,
80. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) ("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.").
Thus, as described by one writer,.Rule 608(b) "leaves the perjury henhouse unguarded."
Gerald L. Shargel, Federal Evidence Rule 608(b): Gateway to the Minefield of Witness
Preparation, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1263, 1264 (2007).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 36-48.
82. Prior to the enactment of rape-shield laws, some states permitted criminal defendants
charged with rape to produce evidence of the bad reputation for sexual promiscuity of the
prosecutrix in an attempt to prove that the victim consented to the alleged intercourse. See,
e.g., Knox v. State, 365 So. 2d 349, 350 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (discussing the common law
and rape-shield statute, and upholding the trial judge's ruling barring the defendant's attempt
to bring up "specific acts or conduct of the prosecutrix with third persons").
83. See Fed. R. Evid. 412.
84. See, e.g., Ala. R. Evid. 412; Minn. R. Evid. 412; Tex. R. Evid. 412; Wash. R. Evid.
412.
85. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee note ("The rule aims to safeguard
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the
infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process."); United States v. Bordeaux, 400
F.3d 548, 558 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that "the purpose" of Rule 412 "is to protect the
alleged victims of sexual assault from harassment or embarrassment"). Professor Aviva
Orenstein describes evidence of a victim's sexual history as "technically irrelevant, but
practically explosive." Orenstein, supra note 8, at 1599.
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the conduct is deemed irrelevant to the accused's guilt in the instant case.86
Moreover, the evidence presents a significant risk of confusing or
misleading the jury in the fact-finding process. 87 Thus, where the accused
claims the encounter was consensual and seeks to prove that the alleged
victim has engaged in sexual activities with anyone other than the accused
in the past, the defendant is offering character evidence to prove propensity
on the part of the victim to engage in consensual sexual activity. Evidence
offered for that purpose is inadmissible. 88 While the evidence is logically
relevant, it is being offered for an impermissible purpose. But for the
existence of such rape-shield provisions, though, criminal defendants would
regularly seek to introduce evidence of a victim's sexual promiscuity. 89
Exceptions to the prohibition of prior sexual history evidence do exist, 90
and of these exceptions, the "false-claims exception" 91 is directly
implicated by the facts of Scenario 2. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and its
state counterparts generally do not reach prior false claims of sexual
assaults.92 Some state rules, however, do contain a specific provision
governing false-claims evidence. 93 In jurisdictions without such specific
provisions, some courts have determined that evidence of prior false claims
do not fall within the definition of prior sexual conduct protected by the
86. Courts view these concerns as legitimate raison d'8tre for rape-shield statutes. See,
e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991) ("The Michigan [rape-shield] statute
represents a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection
against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."); Bloch v. Ribar, 156
F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir. 1998) ("This interest in protecting the victims of sexual violence
from humiliation, among other injuries, has prompted states to pass rape shield laws ....").
87. See State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1215 (Wash. 2006) ("The [rape-shield] statute
clearly contemplates that where there is a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the truth
finding process, such evidence will be excluded.").
88. See Fed. R. Evid. 412. But in cases in which consent is an issue, evidence that the
alleged victim engaged in consensual sexual relations with the accused on other occasions is
permissible. Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(B).
89. See, e.g., Knox v. State, 365 So. 2d 349, 350 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (noting that
prior to the enactment of a rape-shield statute, criminal defendants charged with rape could
offer evidence of the prosecutrix's bad reputation for sexual promiscuity as part of a defense
that the alleged victim consented to the intercourse).
90. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412(b).
91. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.11(2)(b)(3) (West 2007) (providing as an exception
to the general exclusion of evidence concerning a complaining witness's prior sexual
conduct "[e]vidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the
complaining witness"). But see Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2001)
(addressing the Wisconsin rape-shield statute and stating that "[t]he false-charge 'exception'
to the rape-shield statute is not really an exception, but rather a reminder of the limited
meaning of 'sexual conduct' as defined in the statute").
92. See e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.11(2)(b)(3).
93. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.7B (2004) ("Nothing contained in this section
shall prohibit the accused from presenting evidence relevant to show that the complaining
witness had a motive to fabricate the charge against the accused."); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
972.11 (2)(b)(3) (providing as an exception to the general exclusion of evidence concerning a
complaining witness's prior sexual conduct "[e]vidence of prior untruthful allegations of
sexual assault made by the complaining witness").
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rape-shield provision. 94 In fact, a majority of the state courts that have
addressed this issue have determined that false-claims evidence is not
prohibited per se by their rape-shield laws.95  Some have limited this
exception to credibility;96 others permit substantive evidence of false
claims. 97
The difference between the two positions is significant. 98 The defense,
of course, is entitled to impeach prosecution witnesses, but if the evidence
of false claims is only available to attack credibility, the defendant, in
seeking to discredit the victim, generally will be limited to asking questions
on cross-examination about the prior false claims and will be bound by the
94. See, e.g., State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 410 (Iowa 2006) ("[A] falsity
determination simply means the statements are not 'past sexual behavior' within the meaning
of our rape-shield law."); State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27, 30 n.3 (Mo. 2004) ("Evidence of
prior complaints, as opposed to prior sexual conduct, is not rendered inadmissible by" the
rape-shield statute); State v. Boggs, 588 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio 1992) ("Because prior false
accusations of rape do not constitute 'sexual activity' of the victim, the rape-shield law does
not exclude such evidence."); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Va. 1988).
In the present case, Clinebell does not seek to prove that his daughter has
engaged in "prior sexual conduct" or that she has an unchaste character. He seeks
to prove for impeachment purposes that his daughter makes false statements
concerning sexual behavior. We conclude that such statements are not "conduct"
within the meaning of Code § 18.2-67.7, and therefore, the section is inapplicable.
Id. Although the Virginia rape-shield statute was enacted in 1981, the Virginia court did not
rely on subsection B of the statute, but determined instead that the proffered evidence did not
fall within the statute's definition of sexual conduct. See id. at 264. At least one court has
noted "the difficulty in determining what sexual behavior is for the purposes of" that state's
rape-shield law. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 408. The Ohio Supreme Court, though, has limited
the false claims exception to incidents in which no sexual conduct was involved. See Boggs,
588 N.E.2d at 816 ("False accusations, where no sexual activity is involved, do not fall
within the rape-shield statute."). The Boggs court also stated that "[o]nly if it is determined
that the prior accusations were false because no sexual activity took place would the rape-
shield law not bar further cross-examination." Id. at 818. The focus in such cases, though,
should be on the false claim, not on accompanying sexual conduct, if any. Therefore, the
exception should apply regardless of whether sexual conduct accompanies the false claim.
See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence Relating
to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 709, 770 (1995)
("A prior false accusation is not 'sexual conduct,' thus the statute should not protect the
complainant from exposure of prior lies or falsehoods.").
95. See State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) ("We are persuaded
to join the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question and hold the rape-
shield statute simply does not apply."); Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 265. In fact, one court has
observed that "[v]irtually all cases considering the issue have found that false claims of prior
sexual conduct do not fall within the coverage of rape-shield laws." State v. Baker, 679
N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 2004).
96. See Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 265 (observing that in some states "evidence of prior
false accusations is admissible to impeach the complaining witness' credibility," and listing
fourteen state cases in support).
97. See id. (noting that in some states "evidence of prior false accusations is
admissible ... as substantive evidence," and listing five state cases in support).
98. See, e.g., Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[t]he
distinction between impeachment evidence proving bias and impeachment evidence of
general credibility is important," and discussing the difference in permissible proof).
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victim's answers. 99 In this situation, extrinsic evidence commonly would
not be admissible.' 00 If, however, the evidence of prior false claims is
available to prove bias or motive, extrinsic evidence may well be
admissible during the opposing party's case in chief.10'
Therefore, in Scenario 2, the judge will at least permit the defense to
cross-examine the prosecutrix about the previous false claim of rape, 10 2 and
as in a number of jurisdictions, the judge will authorize the defense to call
as a witness the person previously accused by the prosecutrix of rape. 10 3
Following such a ruling in favor of the defense, the prosecution will proffer
a stipulation that the prosecutrix previously claimed falsely that she was
raped by another man in order to prevent the defense from presenting
detailed evidence of the prejudicial conduct of the prosecutrix.
99. See, e.g., id.; State v. Cox, 468 A.2d 319, 322 (Md. 1983) ("We recognize that in
cases regarding prior misconduct, the cross-examiner is bound by the witness' answer and,
upon the witness' denial, may not introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness or
prove the discrediting act."); Boggs, 588 N.E.2d at 816-17 (concluding that prior false
claims without accompanying sexual conduct fall outside the state's rape-shield statute and
are governed by the state's Rule 608(B), which prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence, and
holding that "the defendant will be bound by the answers given by the victim" and "under no
circumstances would the defense be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence").
100. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as
provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning
the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
Id.; see also Quinn, 234 F.3d at 845; Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 265 ("Generally... a witness'
character may not be impeached by showing specific acts of untruthfulness or bad
conduct.").
101. See Quinn, 234 F.3d at 845 (discussing credibility, but noting that "no such limit
[against the use of extrinsic evidence] applies to credibility attacks based upon motive or
bias."); State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding the trial
court's explicit negative finding that they had made no false accusation, but stating
nevertheless that "[w]e hold that despite the restriction [against extrinsic evidence], in a sex
crime case, the victim/complaining witness may be cross-examined about prior false
accusations, and if she denies making those accusations, defendant may put on evidence of
those accusations"); State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27, 32 (Mo. 2004) ("The facts of this case
indicate that Long is entitled to an opportunity to establish the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence regarding the victim's prior false allegations."); Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266 ("[I]n
a sex crime case, the complaining witness may be cross-examined about prior false
accusations, and if the witness denies making the statement, the defense may submit proof of
such charges."). Because the evidence is being tendered on behalf of a criminal defendant,
constitutional law may require its receipt. See Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(C) (establishing as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility "evidence the exclusion of which would
violate the constitutional rights of the defendant"); Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988)
(permitting a criminal defendant to inquire into the victim's alleged cohabitation with
another man on the issue of bias).
102. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) ("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness .... may ... in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness .... ").
103. See supra notes 96-97.
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Even if the evidence is admissible, the question is whether the defense
attorney should offer it. Several ethical problems--different from the ones
in Scenario 1-now present themselves in this scenario. Undeniably, the
defendant in Scenario 2 is entitled to professional representation from his
attorney. At the least, this standard requires the attorney to provide
effective representation to facilitate a fair trial, 104 which the Constitution
guarantees to every criminal defendant. 105  However, the guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel is not an absolute guarantee of zealous
representation.
At this point, to identify that to which the criminal defendant is entitled,
we briefly examine the respective roles of the client and the attorney.
Defendants determine, among other things, the objectives of the
representation they obtain, 10 6 such as whether to plead guilty or go to trial,
and whether to take the stand or remain silent.'0 7 Defendants are not
entitled to direct all facets of their defense, and in fact are not even entitled
to consultation about many tactical decisions that must be made by counsel
during trials. 108
Attorneys generally elect how to accomplish the objectives. Thus, they
decide many tactical matters during litigation.' 09 While the rules of ethics
may not provide a definitive answer to who elects to call particular
104. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) ("The Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance of counsel."); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a two-part test for assessing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)
(observing that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel").
Civil litigants may not have the same constitutionally established rights of a criminal
defendant, but they should be able to expect effective representation arising from the
contractual relationship with counsel.
105. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (noting a criminal defendant's
"'fair trial' guarantee"); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 558 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The
Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant a fair trial.").
106. See Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2002) (stating that, with few
exceptions, "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation"); Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin
on Its Edge, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 55, 62 (2003) (identifying fundamental choices left to
the defendant).
107. See Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.2(a) ("In a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify."). For an interesting and
thorough discussion of the legal and ethical dilemmas facing counsel for a client who wishes
to testify falsely, see Perrin, supra note 6.
108. See Colquitt, supra note 106, at 55 (discussing the roles of counsel and defendants).
Of course, the standards of effective representation are relative, and are determined by the
facts of each case. Therefore, an attorney's failure to consult with the client in some
instances may constitute ineffective assistance.
109. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. ("A lawyer is not bound.. . to press
for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have
authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter
should be pursued.").
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witnesses, 110 under the traditional view of the attorney-client division of
authority,"'1 it is the attorney, not the defendant, who will make the
choice."12 Thus, attorneys commonly choose whether to call witnesses,
cross-examine opposing witnesses, file motions, or ask for continuances."13
Although attorneys are expected to consult with clients about the
methods of representation,' 1 4 during a trial an attorney has little time to
discuss tactics and litigation choices with her client. 115  Even if the
opportunity arises, the client may not be able to choose objectively and
wisely. Furthermore, if the defendant makes the decision and it proves to
be faulty, the attorney may be blamed on appeal. 116 Therefore, it is more
likely that the attorney would make the decision and the defendant would
be bound by the attorney's choice. 117 Either way, though-discussion or no
discussion-the outcome is potentially the same.
110. See Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness:
Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 763, 772 (2000)
(noting that neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules "resolve[s] conclusively the
specific question of who ultimately controls the decision to call particular witnesses").
111. See id. at 766-67 (explaining the "traditional approach").
112. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003) (noting that "counsel has wide
latitude in deciding how best to represent a client"); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418
(1988) (observing that with few exceptions "the lawyer has-and must have-full authority
to manage the conduct of the trial"); Scott v. State, 742 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999) (noting that whether or not to call witnesses is "within the ambit of trial strategy");
Colquitt, supra note 106, at 62-63 (discussing tactical choices left with attorneys); Uphoff,
supra note 110, at 776 ("The selection of a witness is a strategic or tactical decision that is
only a means to the desired end: winning the lawsuit. Accordingly, such a decision is
squarely within the lawyer's province."). Professor Rodney Uphoff has noted that "Supreme
Court cases demonstrate ... that the Constitution provides criminal defense lawyers wide
discretion over decisionmaking issues .... " Id. at 780. Uphoff has also discussed the
control factor at length. In his article, he presented a scenario involving an attorney-client
control issue, but his scenario is virtually the reverse of Scenario 2 in this essay. Id. at 763-
64, 808. In his case, the client wanted to keep his father off the stand and the attorney felt
that the father's testimony was important to the defense. In Scenario 2, the opposite is
possible: the client may well want the witness to testify, and the attorney may be willing to
accept the stipulation in lieu of calling the witness.
113. See Colquitt, supra note 106, at 62-63.
114. See Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.4(a)(2) ("A lawyer shall ... reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished .... ); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (cataloging as a
"basic dut[y]" counsel's obligation "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and
to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution").
115. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418 ("The adversary process could not function effectively if
every tactical decision required client approval.").
116. Such reasons lead to a version of hybrid representation and perhaps some confusion
about who is in charge. This is but one of the reasons why hybrid representation is an option
that should be used sparingly. See Colquitt, supra note 106, at 127. Although hybrid
representation might be more readily available in extraordinary cases, this likely is not one
of them.
117. See, e.g., Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418 ("Putting to one side the exceptional cases in
which counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer's
decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the
stand .... ").
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Although the professional rules may permit a defense attorney to make
the choice, a question that remains is whether an attorney who accepts the
stipulation violates the duty imposed by constitutional law to provide
effective assistance of counsel to the criminal defendant. 118 In Strickland v.
Washington,119 the Court established a two-pronged test with which courts
determine whether an attorney has provided effective assistance. First, the
defendant must show that the attorney's performance did not meet an
objective standard of reasonableness. 120 Second, the defendant must prove
that the attorney's ineffective performance prejudiced the defendant. 121
Failure by the defendant to meet either requirement negates any duty to
examine the other requirement. 22  In the instant context, in order to
establish that the defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by accepting or rejecting the stipulation, the defendant would have to show
that the attorney did not exercise the reasonable professional judgment
expected of competent counsel. Even assuming the defendant can meet the
burden, the test is onerous, and-regardless of the choice made by
counsel-the defendant likely would be unable to convince a court that
counsel's performance so prejudiced the defendant that the result was unfair
and unjust. 123 Thus, by accepting the stipulation, the attorney does not
violate the Strickland standard. Therefore, the defense attorney alone will
very likely decide between accepting or rejecting the stipulation free from
the bias of the defendant and will be faced with the same dilemma as the
prosecutor in Scenario 1.
The choices facing the attorney can be analyzed under several paradigms.
Traditionally, such analysis gravitated toward one of two schools of
thought: zealous advocacy or personal conscience.
One view of a litigating attorney's obligation to the client is that the
attorney must do everything legally permissible to further the client's
interests or goals. 124 Under this view, a litigator cannot represent the client
118. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating that "defendants
facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel"); see also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (holding that to render ineffective assistance of counsel, the
attorney's performance must fall outside accepted norms and result in prejudice to the
defendant); cf Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) ("In any event, the fact that the
ABA may have chosen to recognize a given practice as desirable or appropriate does not
mean that that practice is required by the Constitution."). Nor does it mean that the
Constitution permits the practice.
119. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
120. Id. at 688.
121. Id. at 692.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 693-95 (demonstrating that prejudice will not be presumed).
124. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. (2002) ("A lawyer should.., take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.
A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); Shargel, supra note 80, at 1294 ("It is
appalling to render anything less than zealous advocacy to a client, particularly a client
facing potential loss of liberty or life.").
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halfway; the attorney must be totally committed. 125  Versions of this
paradigm are described alternatively as "zealous advocacy,"' 126 the
"principle of partisanship,"127 or the "standard conception." 1 28
Many attorneys and writers view zeal as the ethical standard, 129 although
not all attorneys and writers are consumed by the zeal conflagration. 130
Nevertheless, the zeal standard certainly has garnered and held the spotlight
for a long time. A wealth of scholarly discussion exists beginning with the
early observations of Lord Henry Brougham (whose words seemingly
continue to surface in any thoughtful discussion of an attorney's duties to a
client) 131 and continuing to a number of writings just this year addressing
zealous representation. 132 Lord Brougham opined,
125. The view reminds one of the old adage "In for a penny, in for a pound."
126. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 Fordham L. Rev.
327, 328 (1998) (noting that, "at least in certain contexts, the principle of zealous advocacy
requires lawyers to withhold information that may be harmful to the client's cause").
127. See, e.g., Rakesh K. Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory of Legal Ethics, 58
Rutgers L. Rev. 653, 665 (2006) (noting that the principle of partisanship "requires a lawyer
to act with 'extreme partisan zeal' on behalf of the client and his/her interests"); Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Ethics, Morality, and Truth-Telling, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 157, 158 (describing
partisanship as incorporating "nearly unbounded commitment to a client's interests and
nearly absolute sanctity for the attorney-client privilege").
128. See James M. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 Yale L.J.
1031, 1060-61 (1994) (reviewing Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (1993)).
129. See, e.g., Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First Century,
81 Tul. L. Rev. 1377, 1381 (2007) ("Today, lawyers often view the duty to represent the
client zealously as the paramount objective of the legal profession.").
130. See, e.g., id. at 1381-82 ("Focusing on the duty of zealous representation alone
creates a lawyer who is little more than a 'hired gun' and one who does not exercise
independent judgment on tactics or goals. The client becomes responsible for the ethical
standards to which attorneys adhere .... The professional lawyer has competing obligations
that must be considered."). See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2005) (noting the existence of
two predominant views of the advocate's role-zeal and personal conscience-and
suggesting a third-professional conscience).
131. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer's Ethics in an Adversary System 9 (1975)
[hereinafter Freedman, Lawyer's Ethics]; Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham,
Written by Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1213, 1215 (2006); Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, 1036 (1975); William C.
Heffernan, The Moral Accountability of Advocates, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 36, 76 n.80
(1986); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to
Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1170 (1985); Zacharias & Green, supra note 130, at 2
& n.2. Some, though, for the sake of brevity, quote only the first sentence. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional
Norm, 33 Emory L.J. 271, 280 n.18 (1984); Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a
Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 Fordham
L. Rev. 1339, 1350 (2006).
132. See, e.g., Camp, supra note 129; Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's
Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join
You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 539, 539 (2007) (rejecting
Therapeutic Jurisprudence principles and the "'rehabilitative' defense lawyer" in favor of
retaining the zealous representation model). See generally David B. Wexler, Not Such a
Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many oJ Professor Quinn's Concerns About
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 597 (2007)
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An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may
bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 133
Under the zealous representation model, therefore, the attorney's choice
in Scenario 2 is quite clear. It is likely in the client's favor to prejudice the
jury in a manner favorable to the client's case, and as such the stipulation
must be rejected.' 34 Zealous representation assumes that a neutral third
party (i.e., the judge) is maintaining a watchful eye over the proceedings.
Therefore, under this view, the attorney need not concern herself with the
potential prejudice to the third parties, 135 and must look to gain all
favorable ground over the opponent.
The zealous representation model, though, potentially legitimates
practices by counsel that, although not illegal, are inappropriate or at least
undesirable. 136 Consider a nonevidence example. The detrimental impact
of emphasizing zealous representation can be seen in the jury selection
process, particularly as it existed prior to 1986 (and, perhaps, continues to
exist today).
Prior to 1986, the peremptory challenge process empowered trial counsel
to remove prospective jurors for "good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
al1."137 Attorneys exercised virtually unlimited and unscrutinized discretion
during the peremptory challenge stage of jury selection. A trial attorney in
a civil or a criminal case, answerable to no one, could have stricken venire
(answering Professor Quinn and promoting the incorporation of therapeutic lawyering as an
"add-on" to other models such as zealous representation).
133. Freedman, Lawyer's Ethics, supra note 131, at 9.
134. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 8, at 1603 ("Yet we cannot very well insist that
defense attorneys take it easy on rape victims-that would subvert the attorney's duty to
zealously represent their clients."); Shargel, supra note 80, at 1294 ("Zealous advocacy
means arming the client with every legitimate means of defense."). As a longtime
participant in trials, though I do note that sometimes the injection of prejudicial information
against one party can have an unexpected and undesired effect, namely that the fact-finder
may riposte against the party presenting the prejudicial information because the party is
viewed as behaving inappropriately.
135. But cf Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 4.4[1] cmt. 1 (2002) ("Responsibility to a
client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that
responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons.").
136. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 8, at 1603 ("[A]lthough cheap shots against the
[rape] victim are unfair, unkind, and arguably bad for society, such behavior is to be
expected of defense attorneys for whom the freedom and reputation of their clients is at
stake.").
137. Exparte Bruner, 681 So. 2d 173, 182 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., concurring) (noting
that, prior to Batson, "a party could exercise a peremptory challenge for a good reason, a bad
reason, or for no reason at all"); Wright v. Bernstein, 129 A.2d 19, 24 (N.J. 1957) ("Thus a
peremptory challenge can rest on a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.").
1667
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
members based on information, lack of information, hunches, stereotyping,
race, or gender.' 38
The peremptory scheme allowed zealous counsel to violate the as yet
unannounced constitutional rights of prospective jurors 139 and to project to
the community the image of a discriminatory court system. As a result, the
Supreme Court addressed the discriminatory practices in a series of cases
beginning with Batson v. Kentucky.140
In Batson, the Court held that criminal prosecutors could not deliberately
remove prospective jurors solely on account of their race, thus protecting
minorities from the discriminatory practices of prosecutors. 141 Batson's
progeny expands this protection to women, 142 and curtails like conduct by
criminal defense and civil attorneys. 143 In the case of discriminatory
peremptory challenges by criminal defense counsel, the Court essentially
has given notice that it will not accept the argument that zealous
representation requires an attorney to represent the client to the utmost. The
Court favors the prevention of discriminatory practices in jury selection
over the fair trial arguments of criminal litigants.144 Batson and its progeny
138. See Bruner, 681 So. 2d at 182 (Maddox, J., concurring) (observing that prior to
Batson and its progeny, attorneys "could strike jurors because of their race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, economic status, or eye color").
139. Although the rule was unannounced as to the exercise of peremptory challenges,
counsel were on notice of the possibility that discriminatory peremptory strikes might violate
constitutional principles. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding
that a state violated the equal protection of minorities if it explicitly barred minorities from
serving on juries). Although it took the Court many years to apply the principle to the
discriminatory use of a state-provided process in a state court, some might opine that it
should have been but a short journey.
140. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
141. See id.
142. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson
protections to gender discrimination).
143. See generally Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (applying the Batson rule to
criminal defense attorneys and defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614 (1991) (applying the Batson rule to civil litigants; a civil litigant violates the Equal
Protection Clause by exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner).
144. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57 (concluding that a criminal defendant's rights to
counsel, an impartial jury, and a fair trial do not "include[] the right to discriminate against a
group of citizens based upon their race").
Some scholars, though, argue that subsequent decisions purportedly applying the Batson
rule actually rob Batson and its progeny of much of their legitimate impact. See, e.g.,
Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to Meet the
Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 501, 501 (opining that the
Court has been anxious to render Batson as "meaningless, ineffective, and unthreatening as
possible," and concluding that the peremptory challenge is "alive and well for those who
know how to use it"); see also Deana Kim E1-Mallawany, Comment, Johnson v. California
and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 3333, 3359 (2006)
(discussing recent Batson-challenge cases and describing the Batson framework as "ailing").
Critics argue, for example, that despite the rulings of the Supreme Court, attorneys may
effectively continue to discriminate on the basis of race and gender; they just cannot admit
doing so. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 Rev. Litig. 209, 246 n.164 (2003)
("In fact, one would be hard-pressed to maintain that the explanations offered by the
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thus demonstrate a pernicious facet of the zealous advocacy paradigm,
namely, the willingness to engage in harmful activities including
discriminatory practices for the benefit of the client.
Whereas those in favor of an ethical system based upon zealous advocacy
might subordinate the attorney's judgment to the client's wishes, 145
proponents of the personal conscience approach uphold the right of the
attorney to utilize her own moral code as a basis from which to decide such
dilemmas. This personal conscience depends on ethical considerations
formed outside of the judicial system and will be unique to each attorney.
Thus, under the personal conscience model the choice of whether to accept
or reject the stipulation will likely depend on a number of factors, as viewed
subjectively by the attorney: What is the likely utility of a limiting
instruction, and how probative is the proffered evidence? Given the
makeup of the jury, how prejudicial does the attorney consider the potential
testimony to be to the opposing side? Does the attorney believe that the
prosecutrix is lying? How strongly does the attorney believe in the guilt or
innocence of the defendant?
With either model, the potential situations to be faced by attorneys are
too numerous to be accurately forecasted. However, whereas attorneys
operating under the zealous advocacy model can be depended on to at least
act in a consistent manner, the personal conscience model is undesirable in
that it affords no guidance or expected outcome for any potential situation.
Instruction under the model itself is inherently vague, in that attorneys are
licensed to decide legal questions with a subjective rationale, as evidenced
prosecution in Purkett were anything other than ridiculous, not to mention offensive and
insulting."); Cavise, supra, at 538 ("The post-Purkett neutral explanation has, for the most
part, been reduced to what one Illinois court has called a 'charade."'); Carla D. Pratt, Should
Klansmen Be Lawyers? Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 Fla. St. U.
L. Rev. 857, 886 n. 117 (2003) (noting that Batson "is frequently circumvented [by
practitioners] through pretextual rationales which" may appropriately be labeled "lies"). In
Purkett v. Elem, the Court concluded that, in applying the Batson rule, "the ultimate burden
of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of
the strike." 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). And, in Hernandez v. New York, the Court defined a
sufficient ground to support the removal of a protected-class juror as "an explanation based
on something other than the race [or gender] of the juror." 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). Thus,
race- or gender-neutral reasons for removing protected-class jurors became easier to identify,
and the burden to show a violation of the constitutional rights of jurors was placed squarely
on the shoulders of the objecting party.
To the critics, Batson's promise has been eviscerated and zealous attorneys will be able to
discriminate, albeit surreptitiously, against prospective jurors at will. See, e.g., Cavise, supra,
at 501 ("Only the most overtly discriminatory or impolitic lawyer can be caught in Batson's
toothless bite and, even then, the wound will be only superficial."); see also Lance Koonce,
Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and the Fate of the Peremptory Challenge, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 525, 560-61 (1995) (observing that it is "likely that the peremptory will remain in
place, damaged but still useful, and courts and litigators will do what they always do when
confronted with new restrictions: adapt").




by David Hoffman's declaration that "I am resolved to make my own, and
not the conscience of others, my sole guide."' 46
Thus, fault exists within each model, in that legal decisions wherein
discretion exists solely with the attorney are either blindly made in favor of
the client with little or no regard for potential repercussions, or are made
subject to the individual rationales of the attorney and are therefore
unpredictable and totally subjective. However, another school of thought
has arisen that commonly considers "professional conscience" as the basis
for lawyers' ethics. Aligning itself with neither zealous representation nor
personal conscience, the professional conscience model maintains that
"identifiable standards for professional conduct exist and that these are to
be determined by the judicial branch."' 147
Authors such as Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green frequently
disagree with the zeal school's emphasis on the attorney's duty to represent
his client to the fullest extent allowed by the rules and law. 148 Professional
conscience proponents focus instead on axioms that are not codified within
the various model codes and rules of conduct, but that exist nonetheless as
part of the professional role. This professional conscience is also distinct
from the personal conscience, in that the professional conscience is a set of
norms that are developed not based upon individual notions of justice, but
rather are developed through socialization among lawyers. 149 Therefore,
though the rules might permit an attorney discretion in a certain situation,
professional conscience may nonetheless restrict the attorney's actions, and
a judge may in turn find fault with the actions if they conflict with that
conscience.
The professional conscience model does provide three guideposts by
which to measure the bounds of the attorney's discretion.' 50 First, the
attorney is not under an obligation to pursue only those goals that favor the
client. 151 The attorney may conduct an assessment of the case of his own
accord, and act accordingly to uphold professional standards of the court.
Second, the attorney need not subordinate his rights to those of the client,
and may instead act to protect his personal interests. 152 Finally, it is the
court that will decide the standards by which attorneys must conduct
146. Resolution XXXIII, supra note 1, at 765.
147. Zacharias & Green, supra note 130, at 12.
148. See, e.g., id. at 37.
149. Id. at 32 ("Arguably, therefore, the 'professional conscience' upon which Justice
Gibson relied embodies professional norms that derive loosely from the lawyer's
professional relationship to the court, which is itself committed to promoting justice. The
norms have not necessarily been expressed in the law; they are transmitted through
professional socialization. Even in the absence of an explicit judicial ruling-like the one
that Rush sets forth (i.e., thou shalt not consciously prosecute an innocent man)-lawyers are
supposed to know through training and experience what is expected of them professionally
and to comport with the professional expectations even in the face of conflicting client
demands."(citations omitted)).
150. See id. at 16 (identifying considerations that "justify a lawyer's self-restraint[]").
151. See id. at 10.
152. See id. at 11.
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themselves.153 Therefore, while the attorney need not subordinate his views
to those of the client, he will have to justify those views to the court.
The professional conscience may be a source of guidance in situations in
which discretion exists on the part of the attorney, as in situations like
Scenario 2 where no rule explicitly addresses an action. Hence, its
reasoning lends itself to an essay whose focus is the gray areas of the rules
of ethics. Nonetheless, Green and Zacharias do not directly address the
issues presented by this essay, largely because they focus heavily upon the
source and impact of the professional conscience, while electing not to offer
clear standards for what the conscience would permit or proscribe in
various situations because they believe rules cannot always provide
satisfactory answers. 154 At most, they may tell us that some actions by the
attorney in Scenario 2 might be incongruent with the professional
conscience, but they do not give us a definitive answer. As such, though
the professional conscience school might give depth to the attorney's
reasoning in such a scenario, it cannot offer him specific guidance.
In sum, despite the existence of various views on the role of the attorney
and client, none of them provide a broadly applicable, suitable guide for
counsel in many situations, including those presented in either of our
scenarios.
III. A FEW OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Our citizenry depends in significant part on our justice system, and its
judges and attorneys, to protect society. As emphasized by Kenneth M.
Rosen, because the legal profession is a public profession, in the presence
of competing ethical values, the American lawyer retains an overriding duty
to uphold democracy as a public servant. 155 While the system likely will
survive for years to come, unless it retains significant public confidence and
support, it may morph into something as yet undetermined.
Obviously, it is virtually inconceivable that we could identify and catalog
all of the possible scenarios that will face attorneys as they litigate cases.
Litigation routinely creates situations that require counsel to make difficult
choices. No list of possibilities or set of rules would ever be really
complete or particularly helpful.' 56 The infinite variety of potential issues
and their facets make general standards meaningless "boilerplate" and
detailed provisions likely impossible. Trials frequently are fast-moving
153. See id. at 12.
154. See id. at 54 ("Although the decision should be made by reference to professional
interests, the preferable approach in any given case requires weighing various relevant facts
in light of the competing interests. The best that a rule can do is to tell lawyers that there is
no one correct answer for all cases within the broad category and then leave it to individual
lawyers, at least in the first instance, to try to get it right in individual cases.").
155. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional
Responsibility, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 155, 163 (2006).
156. See Orenstein, supra note 8, at 1607 ("Both the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of
Professional Conduct are particularly unhelpful in assisting attorneys to confront these
problems.").
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events, and both prosecuting and defense attorneys need guidance' 57 on the
one hand and discretion on the other 158 in order to fulfill their roles.
Thus, it seems that we should provide counsel with some standards or
rules (as we do), but that we also should school counsel that as attorneys
they will be called upon to exercise professional judgment, and in doing so,
they may have to rely on their professional conscience to identify the
appropriate course of action. Even then, their selection of a course may be
overruled by a judge or debated by others. The choice may never be clear.
In our scenarios, counsel are in a position to proffer highly prejudicial
evidence where justice does not require that they do so. Accepting the
stipulation arguably would adequately serve the needs of the prosecution in
the first scenario and the client in the second. Thus, if the respective
attorney can accept the stipulation and advance the party's cause, counsel
can provide the kind of advocacy she feels duty-bound to provide, and at
the same time prevent harm and injustice to others.
Nevertheless, as postulated in this essay and as likely in real settings,
both the prosecutor in Scenario 1 and the defense attorney in Scenario 2
will reject the proffered stipulations. The prosecutor will proceed to offer
evidence of the defendant's adultery on the issue of motive even though the
stipulation would supply evidence of motive and though professional
conscience might suggest that she should accept the stipulation, particularly
in light of the injection of race into the case. In Scenario 2, the defense
attorney will also proceed to offer evidence of the prosecutrix's prior false
claim, although the admission and proffered stipulation would supply
evidence of motive and discredit the prosecutrix's present testimony. 159
Once again, that course of action would eliminate the issue of race, and yet
present the evidence that reinforces the defendant's claim that the
prosecutrix's claim of rape is false.
In sum, neither of the two most conceivable courses of action is optimal,
but the most likely choice in each scenario (namely, rejection of the
proffered stipulation) may be the least suitable of all options.
157. See, e.g., Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function & Defense Function
Standard 3-1.1 (3d ed. 1993) ("These standards are intended to be used as a guide to
professional conduct and performance.").
158. See, e.g., id. Standard 3-1.2(b) ("The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an
advocate, and an officer of the court; the prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the
performance of his or her functions.").
159. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997) ("Although Old
Chief s formal offer to stipulate was, strictly, to enter a formal agreement with the
Government to be given to the jury, even without the Government's acceptance his proposal
amounted to an offer to admit that the prior-conviction element was satisfied, and a
defendant's admission is, of course, good evidence.").
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CONCLUSION
Rarely can we identify and govern through rules or canons all of the
considerations that may come into play. 160 Circumstances are infinite, and
many possibilities will remain unforeseeable until revealed in the course of
litigation. It is beyond our ability to adequately identify and address
beforehand the vast variety of circumstances that an attorney may confront
during litigation. Perhaps the best that we can expect is to identify and
address factors that attorneys should weigh when faced with an evidence
issue compounded by ethical considerations. If we identify and address the
principles, we can catalog the factors attorneys should consider when
exercising their professional judgment and discretion. With that
information, and with due regard to the potential consequences of their
choices, attorneys can exercise their discretion in a more informed
manner. 
161
In sum, we need to focus on what we are doing and how we are doing
it. 162 Litigating attorneys must ask themselves whether their choices are
legally and ethically correct, necessary, appropriate, and fair. If not, they
should rethink their strategy or method. Remember, "What is morally
wrong, cannot be professionally right, however it may be sanctioned by
time or custom. ' 16 3
160. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (addressing
effectiveness of counsel and stating that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.... Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract
counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause").
161. William Simon, though, has opined that we already provide such guidance. See
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1131 (1988)
(contending that informal professional responsibility norms do provide sufficient guidance to
lawyers faced with ethical problems as they try to "think through the issues," but lack
"specific instructions designed to make it unnecessary to think through the issues").
162. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 695, 776 (2001)
(making the same observation in another context).
163. Resolution XXXIII, supra note 1, at 765.
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